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1A B S T R A C T
1Drawing from knowledge management theory, this paper argues that 
the knowledge aggregation problem poses a fundamental constraint 
to knowledge creation and innovation, and offers a potential solution 
to this problem. Specifi c consequences of innovation failure include the 
failure of research and development to deliver new medicines to address 
threats such as widespread and increasing antibiotic resistance, the rise 
of airborne multidrug-resistant or totally drug-resistant tuberculosis, 
as well as a lack of new drugs to deal with emerging threats such as 
Ebola. Persistent constraints to knowledge creation exist in the form of 
market failure, or the failure of profi t-seeking models of innovation to 
internalise the positive externalities associated with innovations, as well 
as academic failure, or the failure of academic research to provide much-
needed innovations to address societal problems. However, a lack of 
theory exists as to how to transcend these constraints to knowledge 
aggregation. This paper presents a probabilistic theoretical framework 
of innovation, suggesting that the ‘wisdom of the crowd’, or emergent 
properties of problem-solving, may emerge as a function of scale when 
crowdsourcing principles are applied to research and development. It is 
argued in this paper that the consequences of a lack of knowledge of 
innovation failure are already upon us, and that a radical new approach 
to knowledge management and innovation is needed.
2Key words:  probabilistic innovation, knowledge management, innovation, crowdsourcing, 
crowdsourced R&D




1For some time now, the ability of pharmaceutical firms to harness innovation and 
produce new drugs has been declining; globally, innovation failure is imminent 
(Horrobin 2000). The decline in the capacity of the research and development 
(R&D) flow of innovations, or the flow of knowledge needed to develop new 
medicines, is predicted to threaten human health outcomes (McKenna 2014). Some 
examples, a few amongst many, of the consequences of a ‘nearly broken’ system 
of the flow of innovations (McKenna 2014) are the failure of antimicrobial drugs 
in the face of widespread and increasing antibiotic resistance (Halifax 2013), the 
rise of airborne multidrug-resistant or totally drug resistant tuberculosis (Maher 
2013), and the increasing resistance of organisms such as malaria to prophylactic 
drugs (Plowe, Djimde, Bouare, Doumbo & Wellems 1995). The failure of the 
flow of innovations also potentially renders global populations vulnerable to other 
emerging disease threats, including Ebola (Krishnan 2014), and the re-emergence 
of polio, as is the case currently in Nigeria (Ajumobi 2014) and Pakistan (Zia 2014). 
A range of different causes of innovation failure have long been suggested, including 
market failure, or the failure of profit-seeking models of innovation to internalise 
the positive externalities associated with innovations (Martin & Scott 2000) and 
academic failure, or the failure of academic research to provide much-needed 
innovations to address societal problems (Dewald, Thursby & Anderson 1986).
In the light of these mooted causes of innovation failure, the tension between 
the notion of exponential global growth in information and knowledge is also not 
reconciled in the literature (Adair & Vohra 2003), and neither is the innovation failure 
associated with a breakdown in the flow of pharmaceutical innovations (Horrobin 
2000; McKenna 2014).
A comprehensive review of the longstanding literature seems to offer certain 
theoretical rationales for the breakdown of the flow of innovations that might, in 
turn, underlie market and academic failure as causes of innovation failure. These 
include the decentralised nature of knowledge itself (Hayek 1945) and the difficulties 
inherent in transferring it, or its stickiness (Von Hippel 1994), as well as its tacit nature 
(Nonaka 1994), in that tacit knowledge cannot be separated from the individual 
(Polanyi 1973). These constraints have been conceptualised as a ‘threshold’ that 
constrains innovation, which cannot be transcended under the current ‘paradigm’ 
of innovation (Callaghan 2014). This notion, of a threshold constraint to knowledge 
creation, stresses the lack of a ‘transmission mechanism’ that can transmit the steady 
exponential increase in volumes of information and knowledge over time (Adair 
& Vohra 2003) towards innovative pharmaceutical products to address societal 
problems such as, for example, antimicrobial resistance. It is the aim of this paper 
to present a theoretical framework of such a ‘transmission mechanism’, in the form 
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of a probabilistic framework of innovation. This model relates to how scientific 
knowledge creation systems can potentially be designed to produce an ‘accelerated’ 
process of innovation. Further, the framework draws from theory that suggests that 
the ‘wisdom of the crowd’, or emergent properties of problem-solving (Mitchell 1996; 
Johnson 1998; Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998; Smith 2003[1776]; Surowiecki 2004; 
Hanson 2000), may emerge as a function of scale in crowdsourced R&D.
This article therefore seeks to build on this notion, that the flow of innovations 
faces an ‘upper limit’ to its efficacy under the current paradigm of innovation and 
R&D. The proposed framework seeks to theorise process relationships around 
innovation and R&D under conditions that are relatively more robust to the 
constraints associated with the decentralisation or non-transferability of information 
and knowledge (Hayek 1945; Von Hippel 1994).
It is argued that this research is significant, for the following reasons. First, in light 
of evidence of the breakdown in the flow of innovations (Horrobin 2000; McKenna 
2014), knowledge management as a field can be uniquely placed to theorise around 
societal problems that require a multidisciplinary approach. The reason for this 
is that societal knowledge problems are by their very nature multidisciplinary. By 
applying knowledge management theory as a lens, this paper offers a perspective 
that may be a useful way to frame approaches to societal problem-solving. Second, 
the consequences of a lack of knowledge of how to surmount the problems inherent 
in the nature of information and knowledge (Hayek 1945; Von Hippel 1994) may 
ultimately result in costs, both in the loss of human life and in resources, specifically 
in the case of innovation failure (Horrobin 2000; Maher 2013; McKenna 2014). 
Third, by providing a theoretical framework that reconceptualises innovation and 
knowledge management systems as either probabilistic or non-probabilistic in nature, 
this work offers what might be a structural break in the way innovation has been 
conceptualised. In the same way as mass-production was made possible by notions 
of specialisation, it is hoped that accelerated knowledge creation may be enabled by a 
wider acceptance of the notion of probabilistic innovation and R&D.
It is therefore argued in this paper that the consequences of a lack of knowledge of how 
to transcend the constraints to innovation failure are already upon us, and that a radical 
new approach to knowledge management and innovation is needed to enable a new 
paradigm in research that offers socially beneficial outcomes. The contribution of 
this paper is its development of a novel and new theoretical perspective of innovation.
The paper is structured as follows. First, the nature of innovation failure is 
discussed, in order to understand the problem that this article seeks to address, and to 
justify the scale and scope of constraints to knowledge creation that impact directly on 
the flow of pharmaceutical innovations. Having justified the problem, propositions 
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are derived and a theoretical framework of certain relationships is offered. The paper 
then concludes with a summary of the arguments, and their relevance for theory and 
practice is discussed. Recommendations for further research are also offered. The 
nature of innovation failure is now discussed.
The nature of innovation failure
1The literature offers a host of different dimensions of innovation failure that may 
constrain the flow of innovations. For the purposes of this work, these are all 
considered to be forms of innovation failure. In the review that follows, certain core 
dimensions of innovation failure are distilled from the literature. The purpose of this 
process is to highlight the extent and scope of the challenges faced by innovation. 
One of the dominant themes in the innovation literature is the conflict between 
academic research and the demands of commercial industry, or differences in 
institutional logics.
Organisations draw from multiple institutional logics (Jay 2013), and academic 
institutions are no different. In these institutions, logics of teaching are differentially 
commensurate with logics of research and other logics imposed by a host of different 
stakeholders (Callaghan 2013). In relation to the tension between academic research 
and commercial demands, Murray (2010), for example, relates these perspectives to a 
landmark case that illustrates the tensions between different institutions and logics 
relating to the market versus academia at the nexus of medical research: the case of 
a genetically engineered mouse patented by Harvard for cancer research, which was 
subsequently exclusively licensed to DuPont, in which the response of the scientific 
community was also studied. At the heart of this tension is the differentially compatible 
logics of academic science, which seeks to pursue knowledge for its own sake, and 
of commercial science, which seeks to develop ideas into private property, primarily 
through the exclusion of others from this knowledge so that the rewards from its 
capture are appropriated (Murray 2010). This work argues that the conflict between 
these goals may constrain innovation output, which in turn has consequences for 
human life.
Horrobin (2000: 341) stresses that the present and future health of populations is 
dependent on pharmaceutical innovation, yet that “the evidence suggests that, despite 
apparent optimism, pharmaceutical innovation is failing”. According to Horrobin 
(2000: 341), to sustain average industry growth, a firm needs to introduce at least one 
new drug product a year and to “sell around [300 million pounds] per year for every 
1–1.5% it has of the world pharmaceutical market”, implying that “the industry as a 
whole needs about 70–100 new products per year of this size”. A company the size 
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of GlaxoWellcome/SmithKlineBeecham would therefore need about three to seven 
products every year, while one the size of AstraZeneca would need at least two to four 
products every year; for Horrobin (2000: 341), it is therefore clear that the “problem 
is that research productivity is failing”.
Mergers are therefore increasing because of the failure of pharmaceutical 
companies to successfully innovate and produce sufficient numbers of new drugs 
(Horrobin 2000). This volume of sales is fundamentally related to the need for 
profitability, or a ‘profitability threshold’. Horrobin’s (2000) notion of financial 
thresholds that constrain the development of new drugs echoes the threshold 
constraint to innovation posited by Callaghan (2014), a constraint that persists 
despite the current exponential growth in information and knowledge. On the 
basis of this body of literature considered above, the following proposition is offered, 
Proposition a, that commercial pharmaceutical innovation faces a threshold limitation 
that is inherently related to the commercial, or proprietary, nature of the R&D process. 
The implication that derives from this proposition is that non-commercial, or non-
profit/non-proprietary forms of R&D might offer some potential to transcend this 
threshold. This potentiality is discussed later in this paper. Another dimension of 
innovation failure that seems to dominate in the literature relates to another source of 
knowledge creation that stands as an alternative to commercial or proprietary (profit-
seeking) research, namely academic research and ‘academic failure’. Across different 
fields, and across time, the literature reveals a range of antecedents of academic 
failure. The term ‘academic failure’ is taken from Dewald et al.’s (1986) notion of 
market failures in academia where innovation does not occur, because of the failure 
of academic research to result in knowledge creation. Included as potential aspects of 
academic failure are failures of research to conform to quality standards, or not to be 
published, and therefore for society not to realise the positive externalities that would 
accrue from the advancement of science. What follows now is a brief review of the 
longstanding literature relating to academic failure across certain academic fields, in 
order to justify the scope of this constraint to innovation.
In attempting to replicate a range of economics studies, Dewald et al. (1986: 587) 
found inadvertent errors in published empirical articles to be a “commonplace rather 
than a rare occurrence”. The “marketplace of economic research might be expected 
to provide a check” against these quality concerns, yet this marketplace seems to 
have failed at this (Dewald et al. 1986: 589). Nevertheless, Dewald et al. (1986: 589) 
highlight these problems in the context of what they regard as classic examples of 
market failure, as the improved quality of articles is taken to share characteristics of 
public goods. Dewald et al. (1986: 600) also stress the particular importance of a host 
of other ongoing problems with research output, not least of these being collinearity 
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of data and correlations between coefficient estimators, where “even slight differences 
in data values or in the numerical precision of computer programs may produce 
sharply different parameter estimates”.
Further, Dewald et al. (1986) stress that the incentive structure in academia does 
not encourage replications of existing studies. Many studies follow a path-dependent 
route to their completion, with multiple collaborations in the data analysis processes, 
including the use of graduate students to produce analytic and other portions of the 
research (Dewald et al. 1986). Constraints to innovative research and to the progress 
of science itself might, however, exist within the processes by which academic research 
is published and disseminated (Bornmann 2010; 2011).
Academic research in certain instances has been found to be associated with 
biases, including in reported uncertainties, in which actual errors are typically 
underestimated, as well as “persistent overconfidence...[as in the case of]...
psychological research on the assessment of subjective probability distribution” 
(Henrion & Fischhoff 1986: 791). Nevertheless, it is in the realm of theory testing 
that these biases may dominate. A concern has long existed across many scientific 
disciplines about the processes by which science is disseminated, in that theoretical 
innovation can be constrained (Peters & Ceci 1982).
In relation to research on the academic knowledge dissemination process, 
Mahoney (1977: 161) found the “tendency for humans to seek out, attend to, and 
sometime embellish experiences that support or ‘confirm’ their beliefs”, which led 
to a bias against the dissemination of new perspectives. For Mahoney (1977), this 
is fundamentally at odds with Popper’s (1972) notions of falsification. Despite the 
challenges faced by knowledge creation that relate to the inefficiencies of the academic 
publication process, the literature indicates that there are serious issues related to the 
resistance of academics themselves to scientific discovery. Campanario (2009: 550) 
argues that the “important topic of scientists’ resistance to scientific discovery” is 
under-researched.
Some of the highest cited papers, as well as certain influential books in academia, 
were first rejected by journal reviewers and editors, including work that eventually 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in the fields of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology and 
Medicine (Campanario 2009). Potential explanations for the rejection of innovative 
articles are that they do not conform to the orthodox viewpoints of reviewers, or do 
not fit with accepted paradigms (Campanario 2009). “This outcome of peer review 
raises important questions about current publishing policies which govern the 
dissemination of new information”, according to Campanario (2009: 558). Further, 
according to Campanario (2009: 559), “critics often argue that peer review operates to 
regulate paradigmatic science (in the Kuhnian sense) rather than to welcome brand 
new knowledge”, and there is a “real risk that evidence contrary to the established 
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views can be suppressed or discarded”. Campanario (2009: 560) argues further that 
his case studies show that “scientists with something truly original to communicate 
often have to fight against the silence, the lack of interest, and as a result the absence 
of citations and recognition”.
In the face of threats like the failure of antibiotics to treat emerging ‘superbugs’ 
in our hospitals, which can make simple injuries or surgery life-threatening (Halifax 
2013), or the rise of pandemics like Ebola (Krishnan 2014), the costs of non-
publication of ideas offering different paradigmatic perspectives may be catastrophic. 
Of all articles that contribute new ideas, it is possible that some might be able to make 
a difference, and contribute to a strengthened flow of innovations.
Another form of bias related to that of non-publication bias due to non-conformity 
with accepted paradigms is bias related to the non-publication of null findings. 
Publication bias also occurs in the form of the ‘file drawer problem’, where articles 
that report significant findings are more likely to be published, thus contributing to a 
false confidence in the rejection of the null hypothesis (particularly in meta-analyses 
and literature reviews), as studies failing to reject the null hypothesis literally remain 
in ‘file drawers’ (De Long & Lang 1992).
Nevertheless, De Long and Lang (1992: 1267) argue that “failure to report 
insignificant test statistics is in fact quite rare in the published literature...We 
find no evidence of this sort of bias”. However, De Long and Lang (1992: 1268) 
acknowledge that “it is very possible that the bias occurs at an even earlier stage”, in 
that “when the data strongly support the null, the paper is less likely to be written 
and, if written, is unlikely to be published”. They also stress that all hypotheses 
tests are “mere approximations” (De Long & Lang 1992: 1269). For De Long and 
Lang (1992: 1270), authors therefore “face a catch-22: papers that fail to reject their 
central null hypothesis will be published only when editors think they are especially 
interesting, but editors will think that they are especially interesting only when the 
null hypothesis that they test really is false”. Further, most “of us suspect that most 
empirical researchers engage consciously or unconsciously in data mining...[there] 
seems to be no practical way of establishing correct standard errors when researchers 
have prior knowledge of the data, or when they report only their favourite results: the 
distribution of the 10 highest t-statistics is not well known” (De Long & Lang 1992: 
1270). Derived from the literature considered above, proposition b is offered, that 
academic innovation faces a threshold limitation that is inherently related to the academic 
nature of the R&D process.
It is not the intention here to exhaustively review the literature relating to 
innovation failure along the dimensions of market failure associated with the 
constraints posed by profit-seeking frameworks of innovation and academic research 
frameworks of innovation. Instead, these examples discussed above are considered 
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to be useful indicators of a problem faced by the knowledge creation processes. 
These and other challenges are considered to potentially act in a cumulative way 
to constrain innovation processes, and to contribute to innovation failure. Market 
failure and academic failure might be taken to contribute to a threshold constraint, 
where another perspective of knowledge management is needed in order to transcend 
it. The contribution of this article is to offer such a novel perspective, in the form of 
‘probabilistic innovation’.
A new paradigm of probabilistic innovation
1As discussed previously, the central thesis of this paper is that the flow of 
pharmaceutical innovations is constrained by a host of mechanisms that have 
resulted in a decrease in the production of medicines, and that problems such as 
the increase in microbial resistance (as one example amongst many) is not being 
met by a corresponding increase in pharmaceutical innovation. This serious 
problem is framed as a challenge associated with the inherent limitations of the 
systems of knowledge creation that underpin pharmaceutical innovation. These 
systems are considered to reflect non-probabilistic processes of innovation, typically 
associated with linear, or non-exponential, incremental innovation outputs. The 
core argument of this paper follows that of Callaghan (2014), that non-probabilistic 
processes of innovation, associated with the paradigm of first-generation innovation, 
cannot deliver the innovations required by society because they are fundamentally 
constrained in their ability to deliver outputs beneath the level of a ‘probabilistic 
threshold’ (Figure 1).
1
Figure 1: The probabilistic threshold constraints posed by the ‘stickiness’ of information
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The probabilistic R&D space: Second-generation innovation
1As discussed, the core argument made in this work is that the decentralised nature 
of knowledge (Hayek 1945) is a fundamental constraint to any system of knowledge 
creation that is not probabilistic, or that is able to tap into the information and 
knowledge of large numbers of people, spread across geographical distances. At 
the heart of this notion of the dispersed nature of knowledge is that knowledge 
is sometimes contradictory and possessed by different individuals, a condition 
described by Hayek (1945) as the problem of asymmetric information, a dominant 
problem faced by social systems, and therefore human problem-solving systems. 
The implications that derive from this problem are multiple. A core implication, 
however, is that centralised systems typically do not aggregate and distribute 
relevant information as effectively as decentralised systems do (Hanson 2000). The 
paradigm of first generation innovation is taken to represent innovation systems 
that do not use a probabilistic system of knowledge creation. Callaghan’s (2014) 
‘paradigm’ of second generation innovation (SGR) relates to systems of knowledge 
creation that harness probabilistic mechanisms to increase the probability of 
innovative knowledge creation. In other words, SGR utilises recent advances in 
information technology to allow large numbers of people to simultaneously focus 
on solving problems, utilising virtual networks. SGR is underpinned by a new and 
rapidly emerging body of literature that relates to the potential of the ‘crowd’ to 
solve problems previously taken to be inaccessible. The logic behind probabilistic 
innovation is that if the number of human problem-solvers focusing on a problem 
is increased exponentially, then the probability of finding a solution to the problem 
will also increase exponentially. On the basis of this logic, proposition c is derived, 
that non-probabilistic systems of innovation are less likely to transcend the endogenous 
limitations of constraints to innovation than are probabilistic systems. Callaghan (2014) 
relates this probabilistic paradigm to the rise of crowdsourcing and crowdsourced 
R&D, arguing that the combination of these offer new opportunities for innovation 
that require considerably fewer resources than first generation innovation problem-
solving. He also argues that proprietary or profit-seeking crowdsourced R&D is 
fundamentally constrained by dyadic linkages between knowledge provider and 
seeker, because of the need to keep information and knowledge secret so that it 
can produce downstream returns (profit). He argues that if the dyadic nature of 
crowdsourced knowledge creation is ‘collapsed’, and if knowledge and information 
is fed back into the crowd, a ‘three-dimensional’ process of accelerated knowledge 
creation can be enabled, which might significantly increase the rate of innovation 
(potentially exponentially if the volumes of problem-solving contributions can 
be increased exponentially). However, what Callaghan’s (2014) work does not 
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sufficiently contribute is a theoretical framework for why this new ‘paradigm’ is 
new or novel, or indeed, might have the potential that is suggested.
This article, therefore, seeks to explicate the theoretical foundations of the argument 
that SGR does indeed represent a new paradigm in knowledge management. To 
justify this argument, it is necessary to develop a theoretical framework that is 
robust, and that can support the implications that derive from this argument. This 
is undertaken as follows, by providing examples of other instances that support these 
arguments. The first of these relates to the problem of asymmetric information and 
the ability of the ‘crowd’, when harnessed in the form of a market, to solve problems 
of information and knowledge aggregation.
This problem of asymmetric information has been offered as a reason for 
differences in performance across a host of different contexts. For Hanson (2000: 
9), large variations exist in the economic growth rates of nations, which to some 
extent can be ascribed to the information failures suffered by political institutions. 
An “important fraction of the variation, however, seems attributable to some nations 
adopting policies which relevant experts knew to be bad...Thus at some level bad 
policy seems to be fundamentally akin to a failure to aggregate and distribute relevant 
information” (Hanson 2000: 9). This example has theoretical relevance to the notion 
that the ‘crowd’ can be an important source of problem-solving input.
What these arguments (Hayek 1945; Von Hippel 1994; Hanson 2000; Callaghan 
2014) seem to have in common is the notion that the effective aggregation 
and distribution of information, or knowledge, holds the promise of dramatic 
improvements to economic systems and other systems that seek to achieve objectives. 
For Hanson (2000), knowledge ‘engines’ in the form of speculative markets can be 
harnessed to provide [distribute] knowledge and information [that is effectively and 
efficiently aggregated], in some cases providing even better probabilistically-based 
predictions of future events than other forms of polling. In other words, according to 
Hanson (2000), speculative markets, which can be set up as ‘decision engines’, can be 
more effective at solving problems than experts are.
Similarly, another related perspective has emerged, that the problem-solving 
capacity of the crowd can generate exponential increases in knowledge creation, 
ushering in a new paradigm of ‘probabilistic’ innovation (as opposed to linear 
models of innovation output) (Callaghan 2014). In short, these arguments are akin to 
Surowiecki’s (2004) notion of the ‘Wisdom of Crowds’, where collective knowledge 
creation can equal if not improve on expert predictions of phenomena. However, in 
considering this body of work, a tension seems to be present in the literature.
On the one hand, these theorists argue that problem-solving can be dramatically 
improved through the use of ‘crowd’ based mechanisms, whether in the form of 
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speculative markets (Hanson 2000) of probabilistic research and development 
(R&D) (Callaghan 2014), or of the contribution of large numbers of people, or crowds 
(Surowiecki 2004). On the other hand, it can be argued that these ideas are not 
new, and that if they were as effective as mooted, then why have they not made a 
dramatic impact in the world today? For example, according to a certain perspective 
(Callaghan 2014), many societal problems could be solved almost immediately, if 
the problem-solving potential of the crowd could be harnessed sufficiently, or the 
probability of being able to solve a problem does rise according to how many people 
contribute to the problem-solving effort. Simply put, this argument posits that an 
exponential increase in the number of problem-solvers would, ceteris paribus, be 
expected to result in an exponential increase in problem-solving output. However, 
this has, to date, not happened, at least in terms of the failure of current innovation 
systems (McKenna 2014), notwithstanding the longstanding use of crowdsourced 
R&D – as in the case of InnoCentive and similar sites (Howe 2006; Lakhani & 
Panetta 2007) – albeit under proprietary conditions.
Indeed, such conceptions seem intuitively simplistic, or perhaps naïve, ascribing 
far too much variance in the problem-solving capacity of systems perhaps to the role of 
asymmetric information (Hayek 1945), or the stickiness of information (Von Hippel 
1994). It is this tension that this paper seeks to resolve, by offering an argument 
that dramatic improvements in problem-solving are possible if it is indeed possible 
to ‘harness’ the latent power of the crowd. However, the primary contribution of this 
article is its development of a theoretical framework of crowdsourced R&D that is 
inherently ‘social’ in nature, or that is sustainable without being underpinned by the 
profit mechanism (profit-seeking not as a necessary condition). The decentralised 
nature of knowledge has multiple implications, and the thread of logic common to 
these implications seems to be the notion that mechanisms that in some way harness 
the information and knowledge contributions of the ‘crowd’ can yield powerful 
problem-solving solutions. On the basis of this discussion, proposition d is offered, 
that rates of problem-solving and levels of innovative outputs of probabilistic innovation 
systems are positively related to volumes of information and knowledge inputs, after a 
threshold point, or critical mass, is reached. In this proposition, the threshold point, 
or point at which critical mass is achieved, relates to the need for large numbers of 
inputs. It is argued that the quality of inputs, in turn, will be a function of the volume 
of inputs, but these will need to be of a sufficiently large volume to provide a normal 
distribution of quality inputs.
Whereas the decentralisation versus centralisation debate has attracted much 
attention from scholars, it has been found that unregulated competition is more 
effective than central planning in economic terms, the latter a conception grounded 
C.W. Callaghan
12
in polar opposites and in a heuristic bias (Hanson 2000). Hanson (2000) stresses 
the existence of a heuristic bias identified by Hayek (1973), where people typically 
have a biased preference for central direction. Betting markets, for Hanson (2000), 
can be used to harness information because they are robust to many disadvantages 
that markets have, as speculative markets are typically highly efficient at providing 
information; in other words, it is difficult to find information that has not been 
taken into account by these prices. Speculative markets seem to be an example of a 
mechanism that can efficiently harness the information and knowledge inputs of the 
‘crowd’.
Theory relating to the way crowds provide information in the case of 
speculative markets
1A betting market is a speculative market, where assets are traded in a way that enables 
people to bet on issues of fact, or final judgements about facts (Hanson 2000). For 
Hanson (2000), as Hayek (1945) predicted, speculative markets are very good at 
aggregating information, even when those that are trading have little knowledge of 
other traders or even of their environment. The mechanism underlying speculative 
markets that aggregates information can be harnessed for other ends.
Hanson (2000) argues that betting markets can create knowledge more efficiently 
than academic institutions, or the academic process, and gives the example of the 
failure of academic research to provide effective evaluations of political institutions. 
Hanson (2000) offers the idea of ‘futarchy’, a method of political governance in which 
voters vote for political outcomes in a process modelled on a betting market. For 
Hanson (1990: np), it is not only political systems that can benefit from modelling 
the characteristics of speculative markets, but academia too: “academia is still largely 
a medieval guild...Peer review is just another popularity contest, inducing familiar 
political games; savvy players criticise outsiders, praise insiders, follow the fashions 
insiders indicate, and avoid subjects between or outside the familiar subjects”. 
Although perhaps a little strong in his attack on academic failure, Hanson’s (1990) 
argument is clear: not enough incentives in academic research exist to avoid bias. 
Hanson (1990: np) suggests that perhaps “the core problem is that academics are 
rewarded mainly for telling a good story, rather than for being right”, and that 
academic incentives typically “reward being popular, fashionable, and eloquent, 
instead of being right”.
As a solution to the problem of knowledge aggregation, Hanson (1990) 
takes recourse to the notion that knowledge management mechanisms that can 
aggregate information can transcend constraints to knowledge creation, and offers a 
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conceptualisation based on ‘idea futures’, or bets on ideas by academics, and argues 
that in such a market for ideas the incentives would be better aligned with scientific 
progress. Hanson (1990) gives examples of academics whose ideas later turned out 
to be right, but who were vilified for their ideas at the time they were put forward.
According to Hanson (1990), if odds were offered on these ideas, then no matter 
what odds were offered initially, these would be bid down or up to reach convergence; 
in other words, everyone involved would be incentivised to be careful and honest 
because they have a stake in the outcome, either way, right or wrong. The market 
would incentivise more research, and more knowledge creation, as new information 
would be rewarded. Hanson (1990) offers the examples of Wegener, who predicted 
the existence of continental drift, and the case of the discovery of the mass of the 
neutrino; in both instances these findings were initially ridiculed by the academic 
community. Following Hanson (1990), science bets could be used to insure against 
technological risk, and prices would offer valuable information about which bets to 
back. However, Hanson (1990) argues that the dominant constraints to the use of 
these mechanisms are legislative provisions that typically constrain the emergence of 
science betting and other uses of the speculative market mechanism to solve societal 
problems.
Nevertheless, Hanson’s (1990) central thesis is clear, that markets have an ability 
to aggregate information, and that ‘information markets’ have been successfully used 
to aggregate information on topics of interest, as a host of examples attest to the 
ability of these markets to outperform experts. However, there are certain conditions 
that need to be met in order to enable this form of ‘crowd-driven’ problem-solving.
Information markets can only function effectively if certain conditions are avoided. 
For example, (i) the thin market problem, where traders need to coordinate their 
activities with regard to the assets they need to trade and when they will trade, but 
do not have a large enough market to do so; (ii) the irrational participation problem, 
which exists when rational agents have hedged their positions and yet continue to 
trade; and (iii) the thick market problem, when single consensus estimates cannot 
be produced due to the presence of too many different estimates (Hanson 2003). 
Another problem emerges when traders make bets that they gain from if they 
win, but that cannot be paid if they lose, termed ‘money pumps’ (Hanson 2003). 
Nevertheless, if these and other conditions are met, information markets can be 
effective information aggregation mechanisms if they require people to trade assets 
in relation to the possibility that certain events occur; diverse opinions can be 
combined into a single probability distribution on the basis of convergence (Hanson 
2003). Hanson’s (2003) work is another example of a body of theory that supports the 
arguments made in this paper, that at the heart of innovation failure is the failure of 
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the mechanisms used in academic research and in commercial R&D to maximally 
aggregate information and knowledge, a longstanding problem that has been the 
focus of seminal attention over time (Hayek 1945; Polanyi 1973; Von Hippel 1994). 
Using a range of different theoretical propositions, it is hoped that according to the 
principles of convergent and discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske 1959), different 
bodies of theory provide cumulative support for the central tenets of this paper. Yet 
another theoretical perspective that may lend support for these arguments is provided 
by evolutionary theory, as it is applied to knowledge.
Insights from evolutionary theory that explain how the crowd can solve 
problems
1Evolution, as a concept, has proved a useful optimisation tool for engineering 
problems, as populations of candidate solutions to problems are used to improve 
problem-solving (Mitchell 1996). Genetic algorithms are developed to apply 
principles underlying biological evolution to computer systems and to develop 
theory relating to adaptation based on crossover, inversion and mutation (Mitchell 
1996). This approach seems to be particularly well suited to fields in which a large 
number of potential solutions exist, such as computational protein engineering, and 
where the potential for computational parallelism exists (Mitchell 1996).
Artificial intelligence research has shown that in contrast to top-down complex 
processes and programmes that sought to take into account detailed behaviours, 
simpler bottom-up processes have been relatively more successful, based on “only 
very simple rules, and complex behaviours such as intelligence emerge from the 
massively parallel application and interaction of those simple rules” (Mitchell 1996: 
4). This research echoes other literature that over time has highlighted the potential 
for emergent forms of problem-solving (Forrest 1990; Johnson 1998; Kochugovindan 
& Vriend 1998; Smith 2003[1776]; Surowiecki 2004).
This process, as explained above by Mitchell (1996: 5), has aspects in common 
with evolution, as evolution is “in effect, a method for searching among an enormous 
number of possibilities for ‘solutions’”, or “a method for designing innovative solutions 
to complex problems”, and is therefore underpinned by evolution theory. The causal 
mechanisms that underlie the evolutionary process of problem-solving seem to be 
analogous to the way emergent processes of crowdsourced R&D may reflect a search 
among a high number of possibilities of which the most successful ‘win out’.
Searching for candidate solutions in computer science has been termed searching 
in a ‘search space’, which represents candidate solutions and a kind of distance 
between them (Mitchell 1996). A dominant problem in computational bioengineering 
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is computational protein design; for instance, a computational search for a protein, 
or a sequence of amino acids, that ‘folds up’ to a particular three-dimensional shape 
in order to solve the problem posed by a specific virus (Mitchell 1996: 7). The search 
space in this instance is therefore the collection of all possible protein sequences, 
which is essentially an infinite set of possibilities, or permutations of possibilities 
(Mitchell 1996).
The fitness landscape is the space of all possible outcomes as well as their fitness, 
which can be represented as ‘hills’, ‘peaks’ and ‘valleys’; evolution is a process that 
‘moves’ populations around this landscape (this computational representation differs 
from real-world biology, as the biological landscape cannot be separated from the 
population) (Mitchell 1996). It seems possible that crowdsourced R&D can benefit 
significantly from these ideas, as they provide a way to differentiate between solutions 
provided by the crowd. Essentially, using the crowd to provide very large numbers of 
potential solutions to societal problems such as Ebola, HIV or antibiotic resistance 
might replicate the mechanisms of evolutionary selection, in this case the selection 
of ideas.
Evolutionary theory can perhaps be taken to represent one strand of a range 
of different strands of theory that provide a ‘bedrock’ of theory that can underpin 
the theoretical and practical phenomenon of crowd-sourced R&D, which in turn is 
representative of a new paradigm of probabilistic innovation. At this nexus, what 
remains to be considered is theory that relates the different levels of analysis. The 
individual is the unit of analysis at the point at which information and knowledge 
is provided in the crowdsourced R&D process. However, the behaviour that emerges 
at the level of the crowdsourced R&D system has certain characteristics that are 
fundamentally different from the behaviours of the individuals involved. Certain of 
these behaviours are considered to be ‘emergent’. It is this notion that we turn our 
attention to now.
The tension between the individual level and the level of the problem-
solving system
1Theory relating to the contributions of high numbers of individuals to a system 
of knowledge aggregation requires solid underpinnings in terms of knowledge of 
emergent effects that are not inherently related to the behaviour of individuals within 
such systems. In his work, Johnson (1998: 3) sought to “reconcile the traditional 
approaches of collective problem-solving involving cooperation and competition 
of globally ‘aware’ individuals and...examples of global problems being solved 
without awareness of the individual”. According to Johnson, a body of literature has 
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developed to address this issue, particularly in the fields of biology, economics and 
sociology (Johnson 1998).
Insights from evolutionary biology and cognitive science suggest that even in 
simulations of herd formation using aggressive agents, collective cooperation behaviour 
is observed; a global structure that “emerges from the dynamics and special extent 
of the system” (Johnson 1998: 3). The characteristics of this system stand in stark 
contrast to approaches that assume that the locus of choice of whether to cooperate 
or not rests with the individual; a flaw of the game-theoretical analysis is associated 
with this assumption (Johnson 1998). According to this assumption, the potential 
exists within the individual for observed global behaviour (Johnson 1998). Further, 
according to Johnson (1998), this assumption is questionable because observed global 
behaviour cannot be assumed to be a function of individual agency. This argument 
has important implications for probabilistic innovation, and crowdsourced R&D, as 
emergent systemic behaviours may emerge that are different from the behaviours of 
individual contributors.
Therefore, for Johnson (1998: 4), “emergent functionality (a global property that 
cannot be predicted or observed at a lower level) can be achieved without embodiment 
of the functionality in the individual...[and]...can include, not only cooperation...but 
also abstract concepts of problem-solving beyond the perception of the individual”. 
Hence, “complex global systems are a consequence of the dynamics among relatively 
simple agents”, as posited in the fields of complexity and complex adaptive systems 
(Johnson 1998: 4). If abstract concepts of problem-solving that are beyond the 
perception of the individual can emerge from systems of probabilistic innovation, 
then it is possible that there are mechanisms that can be captured. It is therefore 
argued here that second-generation innovation theory, and its practical application 
in the form of probabilistic innovation, can be related to predictions derived from 
theory from the fields of complexity and complex adaptive systems (Johnson 1998). 
Having provided a perspective of theory that underlies certain of the relationships of 
probabilistic innovation, and specifically, crowdsourced R&D, the notion of emergent 
problem-solving is now extended to consider the phenomenon described as ‘collective 
intelligence’(Surowiecki 2004).
Collective intelligence: The power of the crowd to solve (or create) 
problems
1A theory of crowdsourced problem-solving needs to build upon a theory of problem-
solving. Simon (1971: 145) stresses that a theory of problem-solving should, firstly, 
“predict the performance of a problem-solver handling specified tasks” and should 
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also explain how problem-solving takes place, or its processes and mechanisms. 
Secondly, it should predict the contextual relationships of the problem-solving, and 
the relation of these to the problem-solving process, as well as showing changes in 
the attendant conditions – “both changes ‘inside’ the problem-solver and changes 
in the task” alter problem-solving behaviour (Simon 1971: 145).
The mechanisms underlying the collective intelligence of markets and other 
forms of collective problem-solving may offer hitherto undiscovered potentialities 
for solving societal problems and addressing innovation failure. Historical examples 
exist of the ability of aggregated problem-solving, or collective intelligence, to solve 
complex problems (Surowiecki 2004). Examples include the almost exact estimation 
of the weight of an ox in a town market and the prediction of the location of the 
wreck of a submarine (Surowiecki 2004).
For Johnson (1998: 4), emergent functionality as a concept offers important insights 
into the behaviours of distributed self-organising systems. A shift has occurred, from 
an interest in understanding distributed self-organising systems towards an interest 
in the processes associated with creating these systems, partly as a result of the global 
shift of societies from a manufacturing focus towards a knowledge focus (Johnson 
1998). In a simulated process of problem-solving using a distributed self-organising 
system, Johnson (1998) found the “system to exhibit chaotic dynamics at the level of 
the individual, but stable solutions at the level of the emergent property”, in which 
diversity provided better collective problem-solving and solutions that were more 
robust.
According to Johnson (1998: 37), self-organising systems occur in nature and social 
systems “when the global system is too complex or the centralised problem-solver is 
lacking in capability or control over the system”. Due to the increasing complexity 
of our world, and the way change occurs “faster than we can evaluate the changes, 
let alone respond to them, the process of collective self-organisation may be the only 
option”, yet in time capabilities and policies will develop to support these systems 
(Johnson 1998: 37).
In order to understand the way ‘collective self-organisation’ (Johnson 1998) can 
contribute to the benefit of all, it is important to understand another dimension of 
the theory that underlies the operation of crowdsourced R&D, namely the operations 
of crowds themselves. A rich and seminal literature offers certain tensions that 
relate to the positive versus the negative influences of crowds. For Le Bon (1896), 
the crowd acts in direct conflict to Darwin’s law of evolution, in that it typically 
can become atavistic or regressive. Although Le Bon (1896) relates his discussion to 
physical groups of people that come together to form crowds, this body of literature 
is considered to be important, as a theory of crowdsourced R&D needs to specify its 
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boundary conditions for its effectiveness, and a study of the historical literature on 
crowds can offer important insights into the different conditions of crowd behaviour. 
Le Bon (1896: np) argues that the arguments that crowds “employ and those which 
are capable of influencing them are, from a logical point of view, of such an inferior 
kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning”.
What is clearly evident from Le Bon’s (1896) perspective is that the collective 
intelligence of crowds is limited and inimical to reason. In contrast with Le Bon’s 
(1896) thesis, Surowiecki (2004: xv11) argues that if you put together “a big enough 
and diverse enough group of people” and ask them to “make decisions affecting 
matters of general interest”, this group’s decisions will, over time, be “intellectually 
[superior] to the isolated individual”, notwithstanding the intelligence and knowledge 
of the single individual.
Surowiecki (2004) argues that complexity does not bar problems from being 
solved by collective intelligence, and offers three categories of problems amenable 
to problem-solving based on collective intelligence, namely (i) cognition problems, 
which might not have ‘right answers’ but will typically have answers that can be 
ranked, some being better than others; (ii) coordination problems, which require 
people to coordinate their behaviour, such as in the case of markets, or matching 
buyers and sellers; and (iii) cooperation problems, which require cooperation between 
people when self-interest, lack of trust or other incentives might not support such 
cooperation (examples of this include tax payments, the management of pollution or 
even achieving commonality on the definition of reasonable remuneration). However, 
for a crowd to be wise, certain prerequisites exist, namely the need for it to be diverse, to 
have independence, and to be decentralised (Surowiecki 2004). For Surowiecki (2004: 
xix), under certain conditions the crowd can act in ways identified by Le Bon, and 
therefore an understanding of the different conditions under which crowds operate 
is important, as groups benefit from communication, but too much communication, 
paradoxically, “can actually make the group as a whole less intelligent...” Surowiecki 
(2004: xix) offers examples of riots or stock-market bubbles, when “aggregating 
individual decisions produces a collective decision that is utterly irrational...
underscoring the importance to good decision making of diversity and independence 
by demonstrating what happens when they are missing”.
For Surowiecki (2004: xix), “[d]iversity and independence are important because 
the best collective decisions are the product of disagreement and contest, not consensus 
and compromise”. An intelligent group “does not ask its members to modify their 
positions to let the group reach a decision everyone can be happy with...[i]nstead, 
they figure out how to use mechanisms – like market prices, or intelligent voting 
systems – to aggregate and produce collective judgements that represent not what 
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any one person in the group thinks but rather, in some sense, what they all think”, 
particularly in relation to cognition problems (Surowiecki 2004: xix).
“Paradoxically, the best way for a group to be smart is for each person in it to think 
and act as independently as possible” (Surowiecki 2004: xx). Surowiecki (2004) offers 
a synthesis of the literatures, and makes the argument that if certain conditions are 
met, the crowd can offer solutions to problems that are, paradoxically, more likely to 
be correct than those offered by experts in many instances. This notion, that crowd-
based solutions, or the information or knowledge gained by aggregating the responses 
of many different people, can offer some sort of ‘convergence’ with an underlying 
truth that is being sought, has also emerged from empirical research, most notably in 
the case of research conducted by Johnson (1998).
Johnson (1998) applied a simple agent-based model to solve a problem in the form 
of a maze. On the basis of this process, he found that the aggregated responses of 
agents demonstrated convergence to an optimal path through the maze. On the basis 
of these findings, Johnson (1998) offers the following as characteristics of cooperating 
collectives, namely that collectives can (i) demonstrate greater performance than 
individuals, (ii) face performance decline with decreasing diversity, and (iii) can 
perform even when exposed to extreme ‘noise’ and information loss.
Johnson (1998) therefore argues that emergent problem-solving offers important 
lessons for solving problems. He gives the example of how a new building development 
will best develop its pathways from the way the ‘system’ allows them to emerge from 
the collective action of many “individuals solving their own path problem, in a 
manner that is ultimately useful to the entire population but which is never expressed 
as a goal at the level of the individual” (Johnson 1998: 3).
This type of problem-solving is perhaps already reflected in the way the academic 
enterprise solves problems (certain academic research outcomes seem to be emergent 
in nature), but it is argued here that this is so only at the macro-level, and that what 
seems to be lacking is a micro-level ‘synthesis’ of the problem-solving-scape so as to 
create a context that makes problems more susceptible to emergent forms of problem-
solving. In other words, a problem has to be formulated in a ‘space’ similar to the 
building development space, in which all that remains is to allow the emergent 
problem-solving to develop its own path, but using a process that harnesses the 
information and knowledge inputs of large numbers of people and focuses these 
inputs on a particular problem. It is argued here that a structure needs to be created 
to allow the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ (Surowiecki 2004) to solve problems such as 
Ebola, antibiotic resistance and others.
What is clear from the notion of collective emergent problem-solving is that 
some degree of spontaneous organisation occurs that is not directly related to the 
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individual level. Johnson (1998: 3) stresses that such a form of emergent problem-
solving is associated with mechanisms that reinforce emerging patterns, but he 
argues that problem-solving can occur even without the presence of these reinforcing 
mechanisms.
Johnson (1998: 3) offers a more specific analysis of collective action from the 
perspective of evolutionary biologists and cognitive scientists. Simulations of 
herd formation including only aggressive agents (with “no inherent mechanism 
for cooperation embodied in the individual”) have been found to reveal collective 
behaviour at the group level (Johnson 1998: 3). Cooperative behaviour from 
essentially uncooperative individuals is a “global structure that emerges from the 
dynamics and special extent of the system”. In contrast, traditional approaches to 
modelling this type of cooperative behaviour typically assume that agents themselves 
embody the choice to cooperate or not, which effectively reduces, incorrectly, to game 
theoretical analysis (Johnson 1998). The explanatory value of traditional approaches 
to cooperation in animals and humans “is rightly questioned when the same 
behaviour can be observed without assuming it exists at the level of the individual” 
(Johnson 1998: 3).
An example of this prediction, of a perspective that takes complex global systems 
to be a function of the dynamics of relatively simple agents, is the notion of a self-
organising social/economic system (the ‘invisible hand’) posited by Adam Smith 
(Johnson 1998). According to Smith (2003[1776]), markets operate in a way that 
allows them to solve problems such as allocation problems through an emergent 
mechanism. Certain implications derive from this notion (of emergent behaviours 
that are fundamentally different from the individual behaviours and choices of 
individuals). The attempt to develop microeconomic underpinnings to explain 
macroeconomic forces might not always be successful, if the dynamics of complex 
systems are not always derived from the properties of the individual (Johnson 1998; 
Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998).
The way emergent systems can solve problems, however, may be more complex 
than the perspectives associated with beliefs in simple market mechanisms. According 
to the invisible hand hypothesis advanced by Smith, individuals act out of simple 
self-interest, but this self-interested behaviour at the individual level “results in a 
coordinated overall outcome”; this is an outcome of the way complex adaptive systems 
operate (Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998: 54). In other words, global properties cannot 
be derived only from a study of individual components (Kochugovindan & Vriend 
1998). A “complex system...consisting of a large number of relatively independent 
parts that are interconnected and interactive...is adaptive if the parts are agents that 
change their actions as a result of events occurring in the process of interaction”; 
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examples of complex systems include “biological systems, immunology systems, 
brains, weather systems, ecologies, and societies” (Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998: 
55). A crowdsourced R&D ‘problem space’ might share certain of the characteristics 
of complex systems, certain of which might be uniquely suited to effective problem-
solving. However, such a system would need to preserve a sense of order, and not drift 
into chaos. According to Kochugovindan and Vriend (1998: 66), a complex system 
is not the same as a chaotic system; they “tend to evolve away from the extremes of, 
on the one side, absolute order and, on the other side, what appears to be complete 
randomness”. The key theoretical concepts that relate to complex systems are “self-
organisation (the formation of regularities in the patterns of interaction) and selection 
(through system constraints)” (Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998: 66). Selection enables 
self-organising systems to constantly push back to “some boundary between order and 
chaos”, and “around this edge, these systems appear to carry out the most complex 
behaviour and adapt most readily to changing environments” (Kochugovindan & 
Vriend 1998: 66).
In general, “markets emerge as a result of locally interacting individual agents’ 
pursuit of advantageous contacts; that is, they are self-organised”; and transactions 
do not therefore take place in Walrasian central markets (Kochugovindan & Vriend 
1998: 66).
While individual agents adapt to the environment, aspects of the environment 
will adapt to the individual; a process of coevolution occurs (Kochugovindan & 
Vriend 1998). Applied for example to economics, therefore, “rather than analysing 
whether an equilibrium exists for an economy with some given structure, in this 
approach one analyses how structures and patterns emerge as regularities in the 
process of interaction of the individual agents”; it is therefore not “nineteenth-
century physics but modern biology or meteorology [which] provides the relevant 
metaphors for this approach to the study of decentralised economies [economies 
that are not command economies but free-market oriented]” (Kochugovindan 
& Vriend 1998: 57). Patterns and regularities are identified in data that are not a 
function of the properties of individual units of the system (Kochugovindan & Vriend 
1998). This notion is fundamentally at odds with the approach used by many in 
economics, for example, where microeconomic foundations are considered to fully 
underpin macroeconomic phenomena, an approach that is reductionist and top-
down (Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998). What this body of literature suggests is 
that a complex system of problem-solving can be engineered, and that there might 
be some underlying forces in such a system of problem-solving that may result in 
‘emergent’ forms of problem-solving. For the purposes of this paper, these forces are 
considered akin to some form of ‘collective intelligence’. It is argued that unless these 
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systems are developed and tested, the consequences of a lack of knowledge about 
emergent ‘crowd-based’ complex systems of problem-solving will persist in the form 
of malfunctioning innovation flows and innovation processes that underperform 
performance thresholds. In other words, it is argued here that it is possible to harness 
the same forces for probabilistic problem-solving that underlie ‘the invisible hand’ 
hypothesis or that underpin financial markets or markets themselves. At the heart of 
the reason for this is that information and knowledge are often tacit and cannot easily 
be separated from individuals (Polanyi 1973), but to some extent this tacit knowledge 
might be captured by providing a platform for high numbers of individuals to be 
‘present’ in a collective process of problem-solving that transcends geographical and 
organisational boundaries between contributors.
The application of notions of complex adaptive systems to financial markets is 
another example of emergent problem-solving, as the information and knowledge 
inputs of relatively large numbers of contributors solve the problem of signalling 
through the formation of market prices, although this process is not perfect. There 
has typically been a tension in the literature in this respect, as standard theory predicts 
that investors are identical, sharing rational expectations of the future prices of assets 
and using all market information to adjust their expectations (Kochugovindan & 
Vriend 1998). The implication of standard theory is that speculative profits cannot 
be earned in a sustainable way, and technical trading has no real scope, as volatility 
is not related across periods; in other words the market is rational and efficient 
(Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998). However, many financial market traders believe 
that speculative opportunities do exist, and that technical trading can be effective, 
while a market psychology holds sway over investors, and market crashes and bubbles 
can occur independently of market information; and further, that serial correlation is 
present (Kochugovindan & Vriend 1998). The interactions between individual-level 
effects and systemic relationships in the context of problem-solving have also been 
studied using agent-based modelling.
Agent-based modelling is a computational method that attempts to ‘map’ 
macroscopic regularities and organisations that arise from the individual interactions 
of agents (Epstein 1999). The agent-based approach “invites the interpretation of 
society as a distributed computational device, and in turn the interpretation of social 
dynamics as a type of computation” (Epstein 1999: 41). The outcome of this body of 
work suggests that social systems can be represented in generativist ways; in other 
words, that from the interactions of individuals, complex patterns in social systems can 
arise: a decentralised system arises from the behaviour of heterogeneous autonomous 
agents. What is not known, however, is the potential of complex systems of problem-
solving to solve societal problems that themselves arise from the problem-solving 
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behaviour of individuals that contribute information and knowledge to a probabilistic 
problem-solving system. This tension, between the behaviours of individuals and the 
behaviours of systems, has also been modelled using computational analysis, in the 
form of emergent computation.
Emergent computation is a term used to describe systems that produce emergent 
behaviour that is a computation, derived from individual inputs that produce global 
behaviour that emerges from many local interactions (Forrest 1990). Systems that 
exhibit emergent computation are typically associated with certain characteristics, 
namely self-organisation (“the spontaneous emergence of order from an initially 
random system”), collective phenomena (“in which there are many agents, many 
interactions among the agents, and an emphasis on global patterns”), and cooperative 
behaviour (i.e. “that the whole is somehow more than the sum of the parts” (Forrest 
1990: 8). At the crux of any notion that probabilistic problem-solving systems can 
be highly effective in problem-solving is the question of how much more effective 
such a system would be over and above the sum of the contributions of its individual 
contributors. Harnessing collective forces for problem-solving might offer a novel way 
to advance science, using mechanisms that exist across different contexts in nature. 
Forrest (1990: 8) illustrates this concept with reference to the way the collective 
organisation and behaviours of ant colonies are “highly sophisticated, including such 
activities as mass communication and nest building” and where, in the “absence of 
any centralised control, the collective entity (the colony) can ‘decide’ (the decision 
itself is emergent) when, where, and how to build a nest – self-organising, collective, 
and cooperative behaviour in the extreme”.
However, this emergent property can also have detrimental consequences. In 
the case of internet transmissions, messages have been found to start as randomised 
information flows but to self-organise into higher-level structures, or token-passing 
rings (Forrest 1990). On the basis of the discussion above, proposition e is drawn, 
that emergent patterns of problem-solving behaviour will emerge from the application of 
probabilistic innovation, which will provide different and new opportunities for solving 
problems.
Figure 2 diagrammatically illustrates the theoretical framework of probabilistic 
innovation. In this diagram, knowledge inputs are shown to cross the emergent 
threshold (indicated by the broken line), at which point the relationships predicted by 
the theory reviewed above are expected to manifest themselves. In other words, the 
currently uncharted territory of emergent problem-solving is expected to exist past 
this threshold. Crowdsourced R&D inputs are processed and are fed back into the 
crowd in order to further increase the velocity of knowledge creation. The velocity of 
knowledge creation is a measure of the speed at which the system can generate quality 
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innovative problem-solving outputs, which in turn are expected to be a function of 
the volume of inputs, or to be the tail end of an expected normal probability curve 
representing all outputs. This framework suggests a ‘transmission mechanism’, 
in the form of a probabilistic framework of innovation, between the high levels of 
information and knowledge available in decentralised locales, some of it relatively 
tacit and embedded in individuals, and the ‘front-line’ of societal problem-solving. 
This theoretical framework therefore relates to how scientific knowledge creation 
systems can potentially be designed to produce an ‘accelerated’ process of innovation. 
The framework suggests that crowdsourced R&D can, under certain conditions, be 
systematically robust to the constraints associated with the decentralisation or non-
transferability of information and knowledge (Polanyi 1973; Hayek 1945; Nonaka 
1994; Von Hippel 1994) by allowing inputs from large numbers of people to be 
focused on specific problems.
What has not been discussed, however, is the technical interface, or the systems 
that process these inputs and feed them back into the crowd. A discussion of these 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, certain of the principles considered 
above have also been applied to the use of computational systems. The application of 
probabilistic innovation might be well complemented by these systems.
Principles of evolutionary theory have also been applied to computational 
systems. Computational systems can also supplement systems of probabilistic 
innovation. Genetic algorithms (GAs) are computational models of the evolution 
of artificial-life systems; these are taken by some to be an abstraction of biological 
evaluation (Mitchell & Forrest 1994). Populations of ‘chromosomes’ are modelled, 
or bit strings, that represent potential solutions to problems, and selection is taken 
to occur, using crossover exchanges and mutations, to develop a ‘fitter’ system 
(Mitchell & Forrest 1994). This process begins with a randomly generated population 
of these chromosomes, or potential solutions to a problem, and then the fitness of 
these chromosomes is calculated as selection and genetic operators (the processes of 
crossover and mutation) are then applied to create a new population, and the process 
is then repeated continuously (Mitchell & Forrest 1994). Repeated in steps, termed 
generations, certain highly fit chromosomes can develop (Mitchell & Forrest 1994). 
GAs have applications in optimisation, automatic programming, machine and robot 
learning, and in modelling innovation processes, economic markets, immune system 
effects, ecological systems, population genetics, interactions between evolution and 
learning, and social systems, such as the evolution of cooperation and communication 
(Mitchell & Forrest 1994). It is therefore possible that computational methods may be 
able to supplement systems of probabilistic innovation. This is an avenue of discussion, 
however, that is beyond the scope of this article. Further research might consider how 
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computational systems might synergistically interface with probabilistic systems of 
knowledge management to further accelerate the velocity of knowledge creation.
1
Figure 2: Framework of probabilistic innovation
Conclusions and implications for theory and practice
1The objective of this paper was to offer a conceptual framework of probabilistic 
innovation. A theoretical argument was offered, that due to a host of different 
constraints, the flow of innovations (proxied by the lack of new innovations in 
the pharmaceutical industry as a case in point) faces a ‘probabilistic threshold’, 
as innovation systems typically apply non-probabilistic knowledge management 
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processes. An alternative paradigm of innovation, in the form of SGR, was 
discussed, and a range of different testable propositions was derived from an 
analysis of the literature. A framework that relates certain of these relationships was 
then presented. On the basis of the analysis and discussions, certain implications for 
theory and practice seem evident. This analysis has offered improved insights into 
the boundary conditions to theory that relate different forms of market failure to 
innovation failure. Further theorising might use the probabilistic lens offered by this 
work to interrogate the different conditions under which probabilistic innovation 
may best be used to accelerate innovation. The analysis suggests that practitioners 
engaged in pharmaceutical and medical research may benefit from using more 
innovative knowledge management systems such as crowdsourced R&D, and may 
also benefit from using these systems to bypass bottlenecks in their R&D efforts. 
Those seeking non-proprietary, or non-profit, forms of innovation such as state 
or non-profit medical research entities may be emboldened to use crowdsourced 
R&D as a social form of R&D that is less resource dependent than its proprietary 
counterpart. The promise of probabilistic innovation, as argued in this article, 
might be overstated, because it is difficult to imagine a social innovation system that 
can accelerate R&D to quickly and effectively solve problems such as Ebola, HIV 
and antibiotic resistance. Nevertheless, if the ideas offered in this paper serve to 
encourage theorists to further engage with the increasingly dangerous consequences 
of innovation failure, then this work will have made an important contribution.
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